Abstract: The coordination problem of a two-echelon logistics service supply chain with one logistics service integrator and one functional logistics service providers is analyzed. The mathematical models of centralized coordination. Stackelberg game coordination with wholesale mechanism, and coordination with revenue sharing mechanism are developed, and then the realization conditions for optimal solution under different coordination strategies are presented. By the comparison between the different models, the results show that the logistics service supply chain with revenue sharing mechanism can be coordinated because it achieves the same performance as in the centralized situation, and both parties can earn more than that from wholesale mechanism. Finally, a numerical example is presented to illustrate the efficiency of the revenue sharing mechanism.

Key words: operation research, logistics service supply chain, contract, revenue sharing, game theory

摘要： 研究一个物流服务集成商和一个物流服务提供商所组成的二级物流服务供应链的系统协调问题。分别建立了集中控制模型、批发价格契约下的Stackelberg主从协调模型、收益共享契约下的协调模型,得到不同协调方法下的最优解所满足的条件。通过模型间的对比,证明了收益共享契约可使得该物流服务供应链达到整体最优的状态,相对于批发价格契约,实现了Pareto改进。最后,用数值试验的方式进一步验证了收益共享契约在协调物流服务供应链运作的有效性。

关键词: 运筹学, 物流服务供应链, 契约, 收益共享, 博弈