Research on the Stability of Industry-University-Research Institute Alliance: Based on Market Mechanisms and Government Regulations

doi:10.12005/orms.2016.0065

Abstract

Abstract: To promote stable development of industry-university-research institute alliance and solve short-term questions of industry-university-research institute alliance in China, decision-making model of union behavior choice among industries universities andresearche institute is built based on evolutionary game theory, and stable strategies are analyzed by replicator dynamics equation. The evolution behaviors of industries and universities-researche institute in alliance are analyzed and based on the above analysis some numerical simulations are given using the Matlab 7.0. It is important theoretical guiding significance in the stable development of industry-university-research institute alliance in China to analyze cooperative behaviors from the perspectives of market mechanisms and government regulations.

Key words: industry-university-research institute alliance, stability, market mechanisms, government regulations

摘要： 为了促进产学研联盟的稳定发展,针对我国产学研联盟短期化行为严重问题,基于演化博弈理论从市场机制和政府调控两方面构建企业和学研机构联盟行为选择的决策模型,以及通过复制动态方程对策略选择进行稳定性分析,同时运用Matlab 7.0软件模拟仿真在不同程度的市场机制和政府调控下企业和学研机构在联盟创新中的演化行为。通过市场机制和政府调控两方面的深入剖析,对我国产学研联盟的稳定发展具有重要的理论指导意义。

关键词: 产学研联盟, 稳定性, 市场机制, 政府调控

CLC Number:

F204

CAO Xia, YU Juan. Research on the Stability of Industry-University-Research Institute Alliance: Based on Market Mechanisms and Government Regulations[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2016, 25(2): 203-213.

曹霞,于娟. 市场机制和政府调控下产学研联盟稳定性研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2016, 25(2): 203-213.

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