Abstract: To investigate the influence of different market powers and government regulations on closed-loop supply chain(CLSC)decision-makings for waste electrical and electronic equipment(WEEE), two models for CLSC consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer and customers are developed with or without government regulations respectively. Based on game theory, optimal government regulation tools, optimal operation strategies and profits of CLSC members, and optimal social welfare are obtained while the market is dominated by the manufacturer or the retailer. The results show that whether it is under government regulation or not, the market power has no impacts on retail price, recycling rate, government regulation tools and social welfare, but it would influence wholesale price, collection price and profits of members. While the market is dominated by the manufacturer, the wholesale price is higher; while the market is dominated by retailer, the collection price is higher. In general, both the manufacturer and the retailer can achieve maximal profits when the market is dominated by itself. In addition, whether the market is dominated by the manufacturer or the retailer, government regulations would increase wholesale price and retail price. While the indicator of recycling rate is less than the manufacturer’s optimal recycling rate, government regulations would usually increase collection price and profits of members.

Key words: closed-loop supply chain, market powers, game theory, government regulation, WEEE

摘要： 为了研究不同市场力量主导下电器电子产品闭环供应链(CLSC)决策的差异以及政府规制对决策的影响,在政府规制和无政府规制下建立由制造商、销售商和消费者构成的闭环供应链模型,并分别在制造商和销售商主导市场的情形下,基于博弈方法求得政府最优规制工具、CLSC各成员的最优经营策略和利润以及社会福利。结果表明:无论政府规制与否,不同市场力量主导不会影响销售价、再生利用率和政府规制工具的制定,也不会影响社会福利,但会影响批发价和回收价决策以及各成员的利润,并且当制造商主导市场时批发价更高,销售商主导市场时回收价更高。制造商和销售商通常都在自己主导市场时利润最大。此外,无论市场主导力量是制造商还是销售商,政府规制都将提高批发价和销售价,且当再生利用率指标不高于制造商的最优再生利用率时,政府规制一般都有助于提高回收价以及各成员的利润。

关键词: 闭环供应链, 市场力量, 博弈论, 政府规制, WEEE