Profit Comparison of Public Bus Transport Service Governance Modes

Operations Research and Management Science ›› 2014, Vol. 23 ›› Issue (3): 244-251.

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Profit Comparison of Public Bus Transport Service Governance Modes

WANG Huan-ming¹, WU Guang-dong², ZHU Da-jian³

1. School of Public Administration and Law, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116024, China;
2. School of Tourism and Urban Management, Jiangxi University of Finance & Economics, Nanchang 330013, China;
3. School of Economics and Management, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China

Received:2012-02-23 Online:2014-03-25

公交服务治理模式的效益比较研究

王欢明¹, 吴光东², 诸大建³

1.大连理工大学公共管理与法学学院,辽宁大连 116024;
2.江西财经大学旅游与城市管理学院,江苏南昌 330013;
3.同济大学经济与管理学院,上海 200092

作者简介:王欢明(1984-),男,江西瑞昌人,讲师,博士,研究方向为公共服务治理与绩效;吴光东,江西赣州人,讲师,主要研究方向为建设项目管理;诸大建,浙江余姚人,教授,博士生导师,主要研究城市发展与管理。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金青年项目(71303028);辽宁经济社会发展课题(2014lslktxxjx-01);大连理工大学科研启动经费(DUT12RC[3]87)

Abstract

Abstract: The marketing reform of public bus transport service needs to choose reasonable governance mode,and the key factor is the comparison profits of all kinds of governance modes. Based on the comparison of the modes between PPP and network governance, this paper takes the PPP mode as a research objective and supposes all subjects to be fair on cooperation. It constructs the profit models of public bus transport service from the subjects' allocation of control rights, effort level and output efficiency,and then it makes a theoretical analysis and a digital simulation. The results show that the profits closely relate to the allocation of control rights, effort level and output efficiency. And only when the rate substitution of marginal cost between governments and social groups is in a certain range, the profit of network governance mode will be bigger than PPP mode. Otherwise the profit of PPP mode will be bigger.

Key words: urban development and management, comparison of profit, cooperative game, network governance mode, PPP mode

摘要： 公交服务的市场化改革需要选择合理的治理模式以应对产生的种种问题,各模式间的效益比较就成为选择的关键因素。在理论比较PPP模式和网络治理模式的基础上,本文以PPP模式为参照对象,假定公交服务参与主体平等的合作,从各主体的控制权分配、努力水平和产出效率构建公交服务总效益模型,并进行了模型的理论分析和数据模拟,结果表明:总效益与各方主体的努力水平、控制权和产出效率紧密相关,仅当政府和社会群体间的边际成本替代率在合理范围内时,网络治理模式的总效益大于PPP模式,当超出合理范围时会使前者小于后者。

关键词: 城市发展与管理, 效益比较, 合作博弈, 网络治理模式, PPP模式

CLC Number:

F570

WANG Huan-ming, WU Guang-dong, ZHU Da-jian. Profit Comparison of Public Bus Transport Service Governance Modes[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2014, 23(3): 244-251.

王欢明, 吴光东, 诸大建. 公交服务治理模式的效益比较研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2014, 23(3): 244-251.

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Profit Comparison of Public Bus Transport Service Governance Modes

公交服务治理模式的效益比较研究

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