Abstract: Considering stochastic demand and technology change, based on a one-supplier and one-retailer supply chain with supplier capacity constraint, this paper studies supplier's wholesale price policy and technology innovation strategy as well as retailer's order decision. A three-stage Stackelberg game model is built and supplier's optimal wholesale price and technology innovation strategy as well as retailer's optimal order policy are obtained by inverse deduction. The impact of supplier capacity, new technology arrival probability, market demand expectation and variation on supplier profit, retailer profit and the supply chain profit is analyzed, respectively. The results show that when supplier's capacity is scarce, technology innovation will improve the profits of supplier and the whole supply chain but decrease retailer's profit as he bears supplier's technology innovation investment cost indirectly; whereas when supplier's capacity is surplus, technology innovation will reduce the profits of supplier and the supply chain and increase retailer's profit. The increase of new technology arrival probability raises the profit of each supply chain member. Increasing market demand expectation and reducing variation is beneficial to both the supplier and the supply chain, but may reduce retailer's profit.

Key words: supply chain management, technology innovation strategy, stackelberg game, capacity constraint, stochastic demand

摘要： 在随机需求和技术变革的环境下,基于有产能约束的单供应商-单零售商的供应链结构,研究供应商分销价格决策和技术创新策略以及零售商订货决策。建立了三阶段Stackelberg博弈模型,通过逆推方法求得了供应商最优分销价格和技术创新策略以及零售商最优订货量,深入探讨了供应商产能、新技术出现概率以及市场需求期望与波动分别对供应商、零售商和供应链整体利润的影响。结果表明当供应商产能不足时进行技术创新会提高供应商和供应链的利润,但零售商因间接承担供应商技术创新的投资成本而利润下降;当供应商产能过剩时进行技术创新则会降低供应商及供应链的利润,而零售商的利润增加。新技术出现概率增加会提高供应链各成员的利润;提高市场需求期望并减小市场波动对供应商及供应链有利,但可能会降低零售商的利润。

关键词: 供应链管理, 技术创新策略, Stackelberg 博弈, 产能约束, 随机需求