Abstract: In the context of low-carbon economy, we study the effect of government subsidies strategy by using three modes of game between government and enterprises. By introducing the two stage dynamic game method, we analyze the effect of the different subsidy modes on demand, product price, the manufacturer’s profit, consumer surplus and social welfare. This study shows that the price coefficient and the effect of the subsidy on demand will affect the choice of the government subsidy policy, and we get the relationship between social welfare and subsidy per unit product. In order to provide a support for the government to make scientific subsidies decisions and for the manufacturers and consumers to make good decisions in the context of government subsidies, we analyse the impact of different government subsidies modes on the manufacturer’s revenue, consumer surplus and social welfare.

Key words: low-carbon economy, government subsidies, two stage game, social welfare

摘要： 在低碳经济的背景下,研究了政府补贴策略对政企博弈关系及企业决策行为的影响。通过引入两阶段动态博弈的方法,深入分析了不同政府补贴模式对需求量、产品价格、制造商的收益、消费者剩余以及社会福利所产生的影响。研究表明,价格对需求的影响系数以及政府补贴消费者对需求的影响系数等因素会影响政府补贴策略的选择,并得出了不同政府补贴策略下消费者剩余、制造商收益以及社会福利与单位产品补贴额的关系,本文为政府科学制定补贴政策以及在政府补贴背景下制造商和消费者应采取何种应对策略提供一定的决策支持。

关键词: 低碳经济, 政府补贴, 两阶段博弈, 社会福利