关键词: 双边平台, 广告策略, 替代性策略, 博弈论

Abstract: At present, platforms cover a wide range of fields such as online sales, life services, social entertainment, information, financial services, computing applications, etc., covering almost every link from production to consumption. For example, there are DDT and GaoDe Taxi in passenger transport platforms, as well as Truck Help, LCL, Lala, and Quick Dog Taxi (former 58 Express) in freight transport platforms. In this paper, taking freight transport platforms as the object, we establish three game models of bilateral substitution and unilateral substitution and explore the substitution of a new logistics platform entering the local market, and the choice of advertising strategy.
In this paper, with the help of master-slave game model, firstly, the thresholds of advertisement intensity at which the old platforms take disincentives are analyzed. Secondly, three different alternative models are analyzed horizontally to determine the alternative strategies of new platforms entering the market, and then the advertising strategies under different market scales are analyzed vertically. Finally, the basic model is extended, and the accuracy and rationality of the model are verified by numerical analysis.
The results show that when the new platform’s advertising intensity exceeds a certain threshold, the old platform takes disincentives in the form of price reductions, and does so more quickly in large freight markets. But it will be conducive to the bilateral platform to create higher value, when advertising intensity is within a certain threshold. The new platform should enter the local freight market of “low mobility, bilateral substitution, and large size”, have more market share, and create a higher value. Regardless of the size of the market, the market share and revenue of the new platform are smaller than those of the old platform. Transfer costs will result in a decline in the market share and revenue of new platforms, and as mobility increases, the gap between the old and new platforms will become more prominent. The purpose of this study is to provide some decision-making basis and support for the new platform decision-makers when they enter the freight market and respond to the reaction of the original platform.
This paper is based on certain assumptions, and only considers the market entry strategy in terms of platform revenue and market share, but does not assess the impact of risk assessment of transactions after market entry and the degree of information disclosure of the old platform in the local freight market on the entry of the old platform. In the next step, we will further consider the substitution rate of the new platform in the mobile owner-operator segment, and analyse the significant impact of risk assessment and information disclosure on the market share and revenue of the old and new platforms.

Key words: two-sided platforms, advertising strategy, substitution strategy, game theory