关键词: 产能分享平台, 质量差异, 平台开放, 博弈论

Abstract: The manufacturing capacity sharing studied in this paper mainly refers to a new economic model that maximizes the efficiency of manufacturing production by integrating and configuring dispersed manufacturing resources and capabilities around various stages of the manufacturing process, with Internet platforms as the basis and the sharing of facility or equipment usage rights as the feature. In the platform-based capacity sharing model, companies with idle capacity can share usage rights of their capacity through the platform with capacity demanders for profit, becoming capacity suppliers. This effectively avoids waste resulting from the purchase of production equipment with unstable utilization rates. In this paper, our research focuses on self-owned platforms with their own equipment. As the types of demand from platform customers for capacity aggregation increase, the platform’s own capacity cannot meet the diverse types of demand from customers. At this time, the platform wants to meet more capacity demands by introducing third-party capacity suppliers. However, the quality of the introduced capacity suppliers will also compete with the quality of the platform’s own capacity: when high-quality capacity suppliers are introduced, they will compete with the platform’s capacity, and the platform’s capacity may not have an advantage in terms of quality, which may affect the demand for sharing the platform’s own equipment and revenue. When the platform introduces low-quality capacity suppliers, the low-quality capacity suppliers will also compete with the platform’s capacity, and the platform’s capacity may not have an advantage in terms of price, which may also affect the demand for capacity intermediation and thereby affect the platform’s revenue. The introduction of capacity suppliers with different qualities will affect the stability of its revenue. Therefore, the motivation in this paper is to study what types of capacity suppliers should be introduced and how prices should be set to make the platform have more revenue. In previous literature, research on capacity sharing platforms is scarce. This research can fill the research gap in theory. The research in this paper can improve the platform’s revenue in terms of operational management and can help the platform enhance its operational stability in real life.
This paper constructs a supply chain system consisting of a capacity sharing platform, capacity suppliers, capacity demanders, and consumers. The sequential game method is applied to study the operational decisions of the capacity sharing platform when introducing other capacity suppliers. When the platform has a lower commission for demanders of its equipment, lower commissions for low-quality suppliers, and higher commissions for high-quality suppliers, the openness of the platform will bring higher profits. When the platform introduces high-quality (low-quality) capacity suppliers, the price of platform capacity is lower (higher) than that of high-quality (low-quality) capacity suppliers, but the demand is also lower (higher) than that of high-quality (low-quality) capacity suppliers. When the commission rate of high-quality suppliers is low, the platform can obtain higher profits by introducing low-quality capacity suppliers.
In the future, it is possible to further consider the platform’s openness strategy and pricing decisions while maximizing social welfare. In addition, this paper only considers the platform selecting different types of capacity providers to maximize its own profits. However, if the capacity providers can also choose to join different platforms, then the decision-making of the capacity providers joining different platforms should also be studied.

Key words: capacity sharing platform, quality differentiation, platform openness, game theory