关键词: 供应链管理, 定价决策, 博弈, 不完美互补产品

Abstract: In this paper, a supply chain model composed of two manufactures and a retailer is presented , where the two manufactures provide the retailer with imperfect complementary products(P1 and P2 respectively)and the retailer sales the two products as mixed bundle, to obtain the optimal pricing decisions of manufactures and retailer. We consider decision-making under three scenarios: (1)completely noncooperative game(CNG); (2)partial-cooperative game(PCG); (3)cooperative game(CG). The pricing decisions under the first two scenarios reveal that compared with decisions under completely noncooperative game, what is obtained by using Sharply Value under partial-cooperative game is definitely beneficial for the manufactures and is Pareto improving for the retailer’s profit with certain imperative conditions met. Based on the above results, we get the optimal pricing decisions, which can not only eliminate the horizontal channel conflict between the manufactures, but also eliminate vertical channel conflict among all participants, with the help of Nash bargaining model. The results show that the demands of the two products in cooperative game are twice as many as that in partial-cooperative game; and each number’s profit in this scenario is evidently superior to that in the other two scenarios. To verify our conclusions above, some numerical experiments are followed at last.

Key words: upply chain management, pricing decisions, game, imperfect complementary products