再制造市场OEM与UOEM的博弈与学习研究

doi:10.12005/orms.2015.0018

运筹与管理 ›› 2015, Vol. 24 ›› Issue (1): 129-136.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2015.0018

再制造市场OEM与UOEM的博弈与学习研究

石岿然, 孙玉玲, 吴鸽

南京工业大学经济与管理学院,江苏南京 211816

收稿日期:2013-07-25 出版日期:2015-02-12
作者简介:石岿然(1971-),男,湖南湘潭人,博士,教授,研究方向:供应链管理,博弈论。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金项目(71071075, 71173103);教育部人文社会科学基金项目(12YJC630180)

Study on Game and Learning between OEM and UOEM in Remanufacturing Market

SHI Kui-ran, SUN Yu-ling, WU Ge

College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Technology, Nanjing 211816, China

Received:2013-07-25 Online:2015-02-12

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 在再制造利益的驱动下,一些非原始设备制造商(UOEM)欲进入再制造市场。为探究UOEM参与再制造的进入博弈,应用演化博弈理论构建了原始设备制造商(OEM)和UOEM策略选择的复制动态。研究表明:博弈双方的回收价格、UOEM排除障碍的成本会影响UOEM的策略选择;OEM选择默许而潜在的UOEM进入再制造品市场是二维动态系统唯一的演化稳定策略。进一步考虑了参与人的学习行为,将噪声项引入复制动态方程中,得到了一个非子博弈完美均衡,即当带着噪声项的OEM采取竞争策略时,进入者的最优策略是置身于市场之外。

关键词: 产品再制造, 演化博弈, 博弈学习, 原始设备制造商, 非原始设备制造商

Abstract: Motivated by the interests of remanufacturing, some un-original equipment manufacturers(UOEM)wish to enter the remanufacturing market. In order to investigate the entry game of UOEM, the replicator dynamics between original equipment manufacturers(OEM)and UOEM is formulated by evolutionary game theory. The results show that UOEM’s evolutionary direction is influenced by buyback prices and the cost of eliminating obstacles. In addition, the unique evolutionary stable strategy of the dynamics is that UOEM enter remanufacturing market and OEM give an implied consent. Furthermore, the players’ learning behavior is considered and another asymptotic attractor is given by perturbed replicator dynamics, which is not a sub-game perfect equilibrium. That is, when OEM with noise choose their strategy, the optimal strategy of the entrants is not to compete in the market.

Key words: product remanufacturing, evolutionary game, learning in games, OEM, UOEM

中图分类号:

C931

石岿然, 孙玉玲, 吴鸽. 再制造市场OEM与UOEM的博弈与学习研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2015, 24(1): 129-136.

SHI Kui-ran, SUN Yu-ling, WU Ge. Study on Game and Learning between OEM and UOEM in Remanufacturing Market[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2015, 24(1): 129-136.

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再制造市场OEM与UOEM的博弈与学习研究

Study on Game and Learning between OEM and UOEM in Remanufacturing Market

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