关键词: 邻避冲突, 污染类邻避设施, 演化博弈, 利益相关者, 仿真分析

Abstract: In the process of industrialization and urbanization, while promoting the development of social economy, it also gave birth to the awakening of citizen's right consciousness and environmental protection consciousness.Under the macro background of the overall interests and local interests, economic interests and environmental interests,pollution NIMBY facility has become an important incentive to lead to the NIMBY conflicts after labor disputes, illegal land acquisition.Therefore, it is important to explore the relationship between the government, the NIMBY facility construction enterprise and the surrounding resident, and to sort out the interests of the main body, which is of great significance in the prevention and treatment of the NIMBY conflicts.Based on the theory of stakeholders, this paper explores the role and function of the stakeholders in the conflict, so as to construct the three-party evolution game model of the government, the NIMBY facility construction enterprise and the surrounding resident from the perspective of evolutionary game theory.On this basis, through the analysis of the stable evolution game strategy of the government, the NIMBY facility construction enterprise and the surrounding resident, this paper concludes the conditions for the convergence of the three-party main body to the evolutionary stable strategy. This paper also uses Matlab to simulate the evolution model of the three-party, and finds thatthe government adopts the strategy of non-supervision, the NIMBY facility construction enterprise to adopt the strategy of cooperation and the surrounding resident to take the non-resistance strategy isthe stable strategy point of the evolution game of the three party interest main body in the NIMBY conflicts;high intensity of government incentives is conducive for the promotion of construction enterprises to adopt a cooperative strategy, and restrain the surrounding resident to choose the choice of resistance behavior strategy; the construction enterprises economic compensation has a critical point to reduce the resistance of the resident, only the high economic compensation will encourage people to choose the behavior strategy without resistance;and the resistance of the surrounding resident has no significant influence on the strategic choice of NIMBY facility construction companies.The results of this paper has a certain enlightenment for the stakeholders of NIMBY conflict: first, as NIMBY facilities’ regulator, government should grasping the extent of supervision, perfect the public participation channels, and reduce individual risk perception; second, as the executor of the NIMBY facilities, construction enterprises should actively use the environmental technologies, construct the scientific interest compensation mechanism; third, the surrounding people play a key role for the NIMBY “landing”, they should strengthen their own public rational, reasonable assessment of NIMBY risk, maintain the social public interest.

Key words: NIMBY conflicts, pollution NIMBY Facility, evolutionary game, stakeholders, simulation analysis