关键词: 控制权, 演化博弈, 模式, 选择

Abstract: It is a common phenomenon that entrepreneur and venture capitalists have conflict with control rights. In order to solve this problem,in this paper, we analyze the control mode between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists and the process of the strategies they select in controlling the game, and by applying the method of replicator dynamics, we find that: (1)the result is that joint control or camera control is stable strategy when entrepreneurs and venture capitalists choose whether to fight for control. (2)when the successful probability of the project, and residual claims the venture capitalist to obtain increase, they converge in the control, whereas they decrease, they converge in the camera control; when the probability of success of the project is more than 50%, the reduction in the fixed income converge in the joint control, start-up enterprises’ increased output converges in the joint control, and if not, it converges in the camera control. Finally, the model conclusions are tested by the CV Source database sample data, and the results are in agreement with the main conclusions of the theoretical model. The conclusion is of certain practical significance for guiding the rational choice of the mode of control right of the enterprise in China.

Key words: control rights, evolutionary game, model choice