基于“进场费+收益共享”契约的供应链协调策略研究

doi:10.12005/orms.2019.0176

运筹与管理 ›› 2019, Vol. 28 ›› Issue (8): 69-75.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2019.0176

基于“进场费+收益共享”契约的供应链协调策略研究

赵菊^1,2, 王艳¹, 胡小建^1,2, 孙翠英³

1.合肥工业大学管理学院,安徽合肥 230009;
2.过程优化与智能决策教育部重点实验室,安徽合肥 230601;
3.华南理工大学工商管理学院,广东广州 510640

收稿日期:2017-12-13 出版日期:2019-08-25
作者简介:赵菊(1979-),女,安徽怀远人,副教授,研究生导师,研究方向:全渠道,供应链,双边平台;王艳(1994-),女,安徽黄山人,硕士研究生,研究方向:供应链,双边平台。
基金资助:
国家社会科学基金一般项目(18BGL265)

Study on “Slotting Allowance+Revenue Sharing” Contractfor Supply Chain Coordination

ZHAO Ju^1,2, WANG Yan¹, HU Xiao-jian^1,2, SUN Cui-ying³

1.School of Management, Hefei University of Technology, Hefei 230009, China;
2.Key Laboratory of Process Optimization and Intelligent Decision-making, Ministry of Education, Hefei 230601, China;
3.School of Business and Administration, South China University of Technology, Guangzhou 510640, China

Received:2017-12-13 Online:2019-08-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 在超市等自助零售环境下,影响产品需求的往往是产品的感知质量,而产品感知质量不仅取决于产品质量水平,还受货架空间展示量的影响。本文基于价格和感知质量依赖的需求函数,分别建立了一体化供应链集中决策模型以及考虑是否存在进场费的寄售契约下零售商主导的Stackelberg博弈模型,研究了制造商和零售商的产品定价和货架空间展示策略,并给出了进场费+收益共享的供应链协调策略。研究结果表明分散供应链环境下产品的最优零售价格并不总高于集中决策下产品的最优定价,也就是说提升感知质量在一定程度上可以缓解双重边际效应。另外,收取进场费的收益共享模式可以实现供应链的完美协调,这在理论上说明了进场费模式在一定的市场环境下是合理的。

关键词: 寄售契约, 进场费, 收益共享, Stackelberg博弈, 感知质量

Abstract: In self-service retail environments such as supermarkets, the product’s perceived quality often affects sales’. Product perceived quality depends on not only the objective product quality, but also the amount of allocated shelf space. Based on the demand function of price and perceived quality, this paper establishes a centralized decision model of supply chain and aretailes-dominant Stackelberg game conaidewing whethet to change a statting allowanctor not under consignment contracts, and study the product pricing and shelf space display strategies of manufacturers and retailers. We provide a supply chain coordination strategy of slotting allowance+revenue sharing. The research results show that: the optimal retail price of products under a decentralized supply chain environment is not always higher than that of the centralized environment. That is to say, improving perceived quality can modesate the double marginal effect to some extent under the decentralized supply chain environment. In aeld on the revenue sharing model of the slotting allowance can realize the perfect coordination of the supply chain, which theoretically shows that the slotting allowance model is reasonable in a certain market environment.

Key words: consignment contract, slotting allowance, revenue sharing, Stackelberg game, perceived quality

中图分类号:

F274

赵菊, 王艳, 胡小建, 孙翠英. 基于“进场费+收益共享”契约的供应链协调策略研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2019, 28(8): 69-75.

ZHAO Ju, WANG Yan, HU Xiao-jian, SUN Cui-ying. Study on “Slotting Allowance+Revenue Sharing” Contractfor Supply Chain Coordination[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2019, 28(8): 69-75.

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基于“进场费+收益共享”契约的供应链协调策略研究

Study on “Slotting Allowance+Revenue Sharing” Contractfor Supply Chain Coordination

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