关键词: 质量控制, 损失规避, 网络均衡, 变分不等式

Abstract: This paper considers supply chain network equilibrium based on quality control and loss aversion. The optimal economic behavior of players in the supply chain network is portrayed by way of variational inequalities theory, and a supply chain network equilibrium model is constructed. Then, the equilibrium pattern in terms of existence and uniqueness results is provided. Further, the Quasi-Newton method is built to solve the equilibrium model. Finally, a numerical example is given to conduct sensitivity analysis of parameters of the proposed model and the parameters include loss aversion, the qualified rate of products, compensation and so on. Through the analysis, the impact of quality control and loss aversion on the solution of the equilibrium model and player’s profit can be revealed. The study shows that as the loss aversion of retailers increases, the expected utility of the retailer will increase, and the more loss aversion the more utility increase. On the other hand, manufacturers can reduce the loss from loss-averse retailers through increasing product qualification rate. While the degree of loss avoidance reaches a certain value, the manufacturer’s profit is hardly affected by it. Improving the level of product qualification rate can increase the manufacturer’s profit and the retailer’s desired utility. The loss-averse behavior of retailers reduces the incremental utility that results from a higher qualification rate. It’s helpful for manufacturers to improve product quality by receiving compensation.

Key words: quality control, loss-averse, network equilibrium, variational inequalities