PPP项目建造和营运的治理模式选择研究

doi:10.12005/orms.2020.0267

运筹与管理 ›› 2020, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (10): 157-162.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2020.0267

PPP项目建造和营运的治理模式选择研究

方文丽, 方世建

中国科学技术大学管理学院,安徽合肥 230026

收稿日期:2018-10-07 出版日期:2020-10-25
作者简介:方文丽(1985-),女,安徽合肥人,博士研究生,研究方向:管理科学与工程;方世建(1955-),男,安徽合肥人,教授、博导,研究方向:经济学、创业与创新。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71573240,71172214)

Research on the Selection of Governance Mode in the Building and Operation of PPP Projects

FANG Wen-li, FANG Shi-jian

School of Management, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China

Received:2018-10-07 Online:2020-10-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要： PPP模式在中国情境下实施、建造和营运环节的治理和协调是一个十分重要的问题。基于交易费用经济学和新产权理论,建立数学模型,对PPP模式的治理展开探讨。首先建立了PPP项目的一般治理模式的数学模型,分析了最优社会福利,然后针对需求风险偿付契约分别建立了PPP项目的建造、营运分立治理模型和建造、营运合一的治理模型。研究表明:在需求风险偿付契约下,建、营合一治理模式比建、营分立的治理模式具有更高的社会福利。

关键词: PPP, 治理, 建造和营运, 不完全契约

Abstract: The governance and coordination of the implementation, the building and operation of the Public-Private Partnership pattern in the context of China is a very important issue. Based on transaction cost economics and new property rights theory, a mathematical model is established to discuss the governance of PPP pattern. Firstly, the mathematical model of the general governance mode of PPP projects is established, the optimal social welfare is analyzed, and then according to the demand risk reimbursement contract, the building and operation discrete governance mode of PPP projects and the building and operation integrated governance mode of PPP projects are established respectively. The research shows that under the demand risk reimbursement contract, the building and operation integrated governance mode has higher social welfare than the construction and operation discrete governance mode of PPP projects.

Key words: PPP, governance, building and operation, incomplete contract

中图分类号:

F283

方文丽, 方世建. PPP项目建造和营运的治理模式选择研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2020, 29(10): 157-162.

FANG Wen-li, FANG Shi-jian. Research on the Selection of Governance Mode in the Building and Operation of PPP Projects[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2020, 29(10): 157-162.

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PPP项目建造和营运的治理模式选择研究

Research on the Selection of Governance Mode in the Building and Operation of PPP Projects

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