运筹与管理 ›› 2017, Vol. 26 ›› Issue (1): 89-95.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2017.0013

• 理论分析与方法探讨 • 上一篇    下一篇

政府激励下秸秆发电供应链的演化博弈模型与分析

曹海旺1, 窦迅2, 薛朝改3, 王傲东3   

  1. 1.郑州航空工业管理学院电子通信工程系,河南郑州450015;
    2.南京工业大学自动化与电气工程系,江苏南京210009;
    3.郑州大学管理工程学院,河南郑州450001
  • 收稿日期:2013-11-18 出版日期:2017-01-20
  • 作者简介:曹海旺(1976-),男,河北景县人,博士,副教授,主要从事建模与仿真、系统工程等研究。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(71371173,70971119);河南省教育厅高校科技创新人才支持计划(16HASTIT037);河南省高等学校青年骨干教师资助计划(2014GGJS-103)

Evolutionary Game Model and Analysis of the Straw Power GenerationSupply Chain under the Government Incentives

CAO Hai-wang1, DOU Xun2, XUE Chao-gai3, WANG Ao-dong3   

  1. 1.Department of Electronic and Communication Engineering, Zhengzhou Institute of Aeronautical Industry Management, Zhengzhou 450015, China;
    2.Nanjing University of Technology, Nanjing 210009, China;
    3.School of Management Engineering, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou 450001, China
  • Received:2013-11-18 Online:2017-01-20

摘要: 农户供应链的序贯决策模型,得出了供应链三方的最优决策;对比了政府激励下供应链各主体决策及利润的变化,分析了政府激励的重要性;其次,建立了在政府激励作用下,发电厂、中间商之间的演化博弈模型,并得出了合理的激励策略。最后,以某地区秸秆发电供应为例,对电厂和中间商之间的合作关系进行分析,验证模型的正确性。揭示了秸秆发电供应链合作中的规律,对电厂、中间商制定合理的激励策略具有参考价值,同时为政府调控政策提供理论依据,从而建立持久的合作关系,推动秸秆发电行业的发展。

关键词: 演化博弈, 秸秆发电, 供应链, 政府激励

Abstract: As to the supply of raw materials in the straw power generation, this paper deals with the modeling and analysis on the straw power generation supply chain under the government incentives from the perspective of evolutionary game perspective in the first time. First, the influencing factors of straw power generation supply chain are analyzed, and based on the sequential decision-making model of the straw power generation supply chain which is composed of power plant, brokers and farmers, the optimal decision-makings of three participants are obtained. Second, the decision-making and profit change of the supply chain under the government incentives is analyzed, and the importance of the government incentives is approved. Then, under the government incentives, the evolutionary game model between power plant and brokers is established and the incentive strategies are obtained. Finally, an example is taken to explain the cooperation relationship between the power plant and brokers in the straw power generation supply chain, which also verifies the proposed models and analysis. This study disclosed cooperation rules in the straw power generation supply chain, and provided the basis for enterprise decision making of power plants and brokers, as well as government regulation, so as to establish long-term cooperative relationship to promote the development of straw power generation industry.

Key words: evolutionary game, straw power generation, supply chain, government incentive

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