关键词: 演化博弈, 众筹, Moran过程, 扎根概率

Abstract: Consider the evolutionary dynamics of N homogeneous mixed consumers’ crowdfunding strategies, and each consumer could choose to participate in the crowdfunding or not. Based on Moran process, we obtain the fixation probability of participating and nonparticipating in the crowdfunding when the consumer groups are finite. Comparing the fixation probability of just one individual who takes the participating or nonparticipating in crowdfunding strategy with the neutral invasion probability, we obtain the conditions of the dominant strategy under the strong selectivity and the weak selectivity. Under the condition of strong selectivity, we find that when consumer size is less than some numerical value , nonparticipating strategy occupies the whole population, and the crowdfunding is a failure. Under the condition of weak selectivity, whether consumers choose the crowdfunding strategy depends on the net revenue and outlay cost. Evolution is stable in crowdfunding getting success ,when the net revenue is greater than the triple of the outlay cost. Evolution is stable in crowdfunding getting failure, when the net revenue is less than half of the triple of the outlay cost.

Key words: crowdfunding, evolutionary game, moran process, fixation probability