基于前景理论的环境污染群体事件演化均衡分析

doi:10.12005/orms.2020.0130

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 环境污染导致的群体事件作为影响社会稳定与发展的热点问题,近年来成为各级政府面临的巨大挑战,正确分析事件参与者及政府之间的复杂利益关系及行为机理,对预防与及时处置此类事件具有重要的意义。运用前景价值函数构建了环境污染企业与周边群众对收益及损失的感知价值并通过演化博弈建模进行比较静态分析,刻画了更加贴近现实的参与者认知与决策规律。研究结论表明,环境企业与周边群众具有收益感知与损失规避的特征,在此特征下群体事件发生的概率与政府对环境企业的成本分担、双方达成和解时的补贴、企业相关损失的感知价值以及周边群众对收益及参与成本的感知价值等存在明显的相关性。最后,根据数值分析并与未考虑前景价值情况下进行对比而得到相关结论与管理启示,为政府及有关部门控制此类事件提供理论支持。

关键词: 环境群体事件, 前景理论, 感知价值, 演化博弈

Abstract: The mass emergency derived from environmentalpollution as a hotpot issue affecting the stability and development of society become the important challenge faced by governments at all levels. It is of great significance to prevent and deal with such emergency by analyzing the complex interests and behavioral mechanism of participants and governments. This paper introduces the prospect value function and constructs the perceived values of gains and losses faced by environmental pollution enterprise and surrounding people, and then makes a comparative static analysis by evolutionary game model which describes the cognition and decision law of the participants closer to the reality. The conclusion of the study shows that the environmental pollution enterprise and surrounding people have the characteristics of earning perception and loss aversion, and under these characters, the probability of mass emergency has the obvious correlation with cost sharing by the government for environmental pollution enterprise, subsidies for enterprise and surrounding people when they become reconciled with the perceived value of loss for enterprise and the perceived values of gains and participation costs for surrounding people and so on. Finally, some suggestions are given according to the numerical analysis and comparison with the situation without considering the prospective value, which provide the theoretical support for government and relevant departments to control such mass emergencies.

Key words: environmental pollution mass emergency, prospect theory, perceived value, evolutionary game theory

中图分类号:

C931

谭德庆, 徐浩. 基于前景理论的环境污染群体事件演化均衡分析[J]. 运筹与管理, 2020, 29(5): 161-170.

TAN De-qing, XU Hao. Evolutionary Equilibrium Analysis of Mass Emergency Derived from Environmental Pollution Based on Prospect Theory[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2020, 29(5): 161-170.

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