关键词: 道德危机, 网红店铺, 演化博弈, 前景理论

Abstract: With the eye candy stores becoming popular, it is easy for them to be imitated in a short time, and authentic shops find it difficult to respond effectively because of information asymmetry and high cost of defending rights from different places. On the other hand, with the market competition intensified, selling second-handed goods at the best quality prices has also occurred, so the founders of eye candy stores have faced both the counterfeit crisis and moral one. Against this background, this paper studies the three-party evolutionary game of the originator and followers of the eye candy stores and the regulatory platform. The study finds that for the founders and followers of eye candy stores, only when the amount of fines is large enough can the regulator effectively prevent infringement and violation. Based on the prospect theory, further discussion finds that with the change of the amount of fines, the risk attitude of the founders is changed, and the optimal penalty level is obtained at the end of the paper, and policy recommendations are proposed from the aspects of increasing enforcement and amount of fines.

Key words: moral crisis, net red shop, evolutionary game, prospect theory