关键词: 翻新产品, 双寡头竞争, 质量获取, 质量披露, 博弈论

Abstract: Refurbishment is the most common form of product recycling, which can effectively alleviate the environmental pollution caused by waste and generate revenue by its low-cost advantage. However, refurbished products come from used products, which makes the quality of refurbished products more difficult to control, and even refurbishers themselves cannot recognize the exact quality of refurbished products. The refurbished product quality acquisition and disclosure have become a key strategy to influence consumers’ purchasing decisions. The quality acquisition methods are generally categorized into two different quality disclosure modes: voluntary disclosure mode and mandatory disclosure mode. Under the voluntary mode, the refurbisher can decide whether or not to disclose the quality. For example, Apple’s refurbisher in China, Foxconn, and Huawei’s refurbishment factory have invested in repair and testing equipment to obtain accurate quality of refurbished products. However, in some cases, refurbishers do not have the autonomy to decide whether or not to disclose quality. For example, the second-hand refurbished product sales platform “Paipai” has launched a “blockchain quality traceability system”. Once a refurbished product is recorded in the chain, the information will be passed on to the consumer regardless of the quality of the refurbished product. In addition, some small-scale refurbishers test the quality and sell refurbished products through the BackMarket refurbishment sales platform, and the test results are categorized into “Fair”, “Good” and “Excellent” for mandatory disclosure to consumers.
This study explores the quality acquisition and disclosure strategy for refurbishers introducing new product competition. The innovations of this study are as follows: (1)Based on the imperfect characteristics of refurbished products, consumers’ psychological cognitive attitudes towards refurbished products are introduced to explore their influence on quality acquisition and disclosure strategies of refurbishers. (2)By introducing the competition of manufacturer’s perfect new products, this study compensates for the insufficient consideration of the influence of market structure in the previous studies on the quality acquisition and disclosure strategy.(3)In the context of circular economy, the strategy of quality acquisition and disclosure is formulated to address the uncertainty of refurbished products’ quality, which provides useful guidance for the realization of economic value of refurbished products.
The main conclusions are shown below: (1)The incentive for refurbishers to acquire quality is greater in the voluntary disclosure mode than in the mandatory disclosure mode. (2)As competition becomes more intense, the refurbisher’s willingness to acquire quality becomes weaker under the voluntary disclosure mode. However, it first increases and then decreases under the mandatory disclosure mode. (3)After acquiring quality, the more negative the consumers’ attitudes are towards refurbished products, the stronger the refurbisher is willing to disclose quality. (4)When the quality acquisition cost is determined, the refurbisher should choose the voluntary disclosure mode when cost is small, but select the mandatory mode when it is large. However, when the cost is indeterminate, the refurbisher should proceed with the mandatory disclosure model for quality acquisition. (5)The effect of new product competition on the refurbisher’s choice of disclosure mode is related to consumers’ psychological cognitive attitudes towards refurbished products.
There are shortcomings in the study: the manufacturer’s quality acquisition and disclosure strategy has been neglected and the potential effect of “free riding” on refurbished products is not introduced, which is worth exploring in future research.

Key words: refurbished products, duopoly competition, quality acquisition, quality disclosure, game theory