非对称心理压力下的低碳环境友好技术国际转移博弈研究

doi:10.12005/orms.2020.0061

运筹与管理 ›› 2020, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (3): 36-43.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2020.0061

非对称心理压力下的低碳环境友好技术国际转移博弈研究

肖汉杰^1,2, 彭定洪², 王华²

1. 湖州师范学院商学院,浙江湖州 313000;
2昆明理工大学复杂有色金属资源清洁利用国家重点实验室,昆明理工大学质量发展研究院,云南昆明 650093

收稿日期:2017-07-27 出版日期:2020-03-25
作者简介:肖汉杰(1987-), 男, 湖北鄂州人, 讲师, 研究方向为质量工程与节能减排评价;彭定洪(1982-), 男, 云南曲靖人, 副教授, 研究方向为决策理论与方法及其应用;王华(1965-), 男, 湖北咸宁人, 教授, 研究方向:新能源技术。
基金资助:
浙江省自然科学基金(LQ20G010005);湖州市科技计划项目(2018YZ13)

A Game Study of International Transfer of Low-carbon Environmentally Friendly Technology under Asymmetrical Psychological Pressure

XIAO Han-jie^1,2, PENG Ding-hong², WANG Hua²

1. Business School, Huzhou University, Huzhou 313000, China;
2. State Key Laboratory of Complex Nonferrous Metal Resources Clean Utilization, Quality Development Institute, Kunming University of Science and Technology, Kunming 650093, China

Received:2017-07-27 Online:2020-03-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 在全球积极应对和适应气候变化的背景下,研究了心理压力和信息条件因素对低碳环境友好技术(LCEFT)转让企业与受让企业决策行为的影响。通过引入对谈判区间、还价策略和不同心理压力的假设,构造了非对称信息下的LEFCT转移讨价还价博弈模型,深入分析了收益贴现参数、心理压力参数和谈判区间等因素对博弈双方报价策略、还价策略以及成交价格所产生的影响。研究表明,心理压力和信息条件都会直接影响博弈双方的报价策略、还价策略和最终的成交价格,并得出了不同信息条件下受让企业“见好就收”和“对半侃价”的还价策略。本文为受让企业在应对全球气候变化中面对不同的心理压力和信息条件所应采取何种还价策略提供了一定的决策支持。

关键词: 低碳环境友好技术, 国际转移, 讨价还价, 非对称信息, 博弈

Abstract: Against the background of addressing the global climate change, we have made an investigation of the effecting mechanism of factors like psychological pressure and informational condition on the decision making of the transferring enterprise and the assigned enterprise with low-carbon environmentally friendly technology(LCEFT). By introducing the assumption of negotiation range, bargaining strategy and different psychological pressure, we build a bargaining game model of LCEFT under asymmetrical information to investigate the effects of discounting return, psychological pressure and negotiation range parameters on the strategies of making an offer, bargain and end price of both game parties. This study has shown that psychological pressure and informational condition have a direct influence on the decision making of offering, bargaining and final determination of end price. Under different informational conditions, the assigned enterprise adopts the bargaining strategies like “hit and run” and “cut the half price”. This paper has provided a reference for choosing a reasonable bargaining strategy under different psychological pressure and informational conditions for the assigned enterprises in coping with the global climate change.

Key words: low-carbon environmental friendly technology, international transfer, bargaining, asymmetrical information, game

中图分类号:

F270
F224.32

肖汉杰, 彭定洪, 王华. 非对称心理压力下的低碳环境友好技术国际转移博弈研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2020, 29(3): 36-43.

XIAO Han-jie, PENG Ding-hong, WANG Hua. A Game Study of International Transfer of Low-carbon Environmentally Friendly Technology under Asymmetrical Psychological Pressure[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2020, 29(3): 36-43.

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非对称心理压力下的低碳环境友好技术国际转移博弈研究

A Game Study of International Transfer of Low-carbon Environmentally Friendly Technology under Asymmetrical Psychological Pressure

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