关键词: 演化博弈, 复制动态方程, 金融化机制, 演化稳定策略

Abstract: Since the 19th CPC National Congress, China’s reform and opening up process has been accelerating. The financial system reform has also deepened, and the degree of openness has continued to increase. During this period, the problem of financialization of the real economy has become increasingly prominent in China. The phenomenon of “degeneration from the real to the virtual” in economy has become more and more serious. The healthy development of the real economy will determine the strength of a country’s overall national strength. Therefore, it is necessary to discuss China’s strategy to prevent “hollowing” of the industry by studying the issue of financialization of entity enterprises. We use evolutionary games and simulation methods to build a tripartite evolutionary game analysis framework based on the financialization of government regulators, entity enterprises and financial enterprises, focus on analyzing the factors that affect government regulation on corporate strategy choices, and simulate the evolution equilibrium process. Our studies have shown that measures taken by the government, such as increasing penalties, increasing tax cuts or subsidies, have a positive effect on promoting cooperative relations between entity and financial enterprises, and entity and financial enterprises are more sensitive to changes in the level of predatory technology and social endowment doubling rates.

Key words: evolutionary game, duplicative dynamic equation, financialization mechanism, evolutionary stable strategy