动态演化博弈视角下的“中国式过马路”问题研究

doi:10.12005/orms.2016.0224

运筹与管理 ›› 2016, Vol. 25 ›› Issue (6): 230-235.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2016.0224

动态演化博弈视角下的“中国式过马路”问题研究

林徐勋¹, 袁鹏程², 霍良安²

1.常州大学商学院,江苏常州 213164;
2.上海理工大学管理学院,上海 200093

收稿日期:2014-09-24 出版日期:2016-12-20
作者简介:林徐勋(1984-),男,浙江温州人,讲师,博士,主要研究方向为交通博弈行为演化;袁鹏程(1982-),通讯作者,男,山西晋城人,讲师,博士,主要研究方向为交通复杂系统;霍良安(1981-),男,陕西咸阳人,讲师,博士,主要研究方向为交通应急管理。
基金资助:
国家社会科学基金重点项目(16AGL011);上海市自然科学基金资助项目(15ZR1429200);上海理工大学博士启动资金资助项目(BSQD201407)

Research on “Chinese-style Road Crossing” Under the Perspectiveof Dynamic Evolutionary Game Theory

LIN Xu-xun¹, YUAN Peng-cheng², HUO Liang-an²

1.Business School of Changzhou University, Changzhou 213164, China;
2.Business School, University of Shanghai for Science &
Technology, Shanghai 200093, China

Received:2014-09-24 Online:2016-12-20

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 以“中国式过马路”现象中有闯红灯倾向的行人为研究对象,分析其过街行为特点,建立了行人过街的动态演化博弈模型,探讨了不同时刻、不同条件下行人的博弈选择策略;在此基础上论证了相应管理措施的有效性。结合数值模拟得到以下结论:(1)在不采取任何惩治措施条件下所有行人倾向于选择直接闯红灯;(2)轻微的惩治措施起不到显著效果,惩治措施达到一定力度后才能对“中国式过马路”现象有所改善;(3)过街行人的策略选择会受到周边行人行为的影响;(4)过长的红灯等待时间会诱发行人选择主动闯红灯的动机。综上四点得到针对性的改善措施:合理设置并优化信号配时,缩短行人过街等待时间,在此基础上加大惩治力度并提高行人总体素质和遵纪守法意识。

关键词: 中国式过马路, 行人过街, 演化博弈, 惩治措施

Abstract: Focusing on pedestrians with a tendency to run red lights in the “Chinese-style road crossing” phenomenon as the research subject, the characteristics of these pedestrians’ behaviors are analyzed and a corresponding model is established based on dynamic evolutionary game theory to analyze the game selection strategies at different moments and conditions and demonstrate the validity of the related management measures. Through numerical simulations several conclusions can be reached as follows:(1)All pedestrians choose to run red light in situation of no punitive measures; (2)The “Chinese-style road crossing” phenomenon can only be improved when punitive measures reach a certain level of intensity, otherwise minor punitive measures achieve no significant effects; (3)Besides the high-level punitive measures the pedestrian’s overall quality and law-abiding consciousness should also be enhanced;(4) Unnecessary long red light waiting time can force the road-crossers to run red lights. Following improvement strategies can be obtained correspondingly based on the above analysis: Firstly optimize the signal timing to reasonably shorten the road-crossers’ waiting time; and then further enhance the road-crossers’ overall quality and law-abiding consciousness while intensifying the punitive measures.

Key words: Chinese-style road crossing, pedestrian crossing, evolutionary game, punitive measures

中图分类号:

U491

林徐勋, 袁鹏程, 霍良安. 动态演化博弈视角下的“中国式过马路”问题研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2016, 25(6): 230-235.

LIN Xu-xun, YUAN Peng-cheng, HUO Liang-an. Research on “Chinese-style Road Crossing” Under the Perspectiveof Dynamic Evolutionary Game Theory[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2016, 25(6): 230-235.

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动态演化博弈视角下的“中国式过马路”问题研究

Research on “Chinese-style Road Crossing” Under the Perspectiveof Dynamic Evolutionary Game Theory

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