政府差异化激励条件下有限理性制造集群的服务化策略演化研究

doi:10.12005/orms.2019.0160

运筹与管理 ›› 2019, Vol. 28 ›› Issue (7): 133-143.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2019.0160

政府差异化激励条件下有限理性制造集群的服务化策略演化研究

张健¹, 廖梦洁², 齐林¹

1.北京信息科技大学经济管理学院,北京 1000192;
2.中国农业大学经济管理学院,北京 100083

收稿日期:2018-02-12 出版日期:2019-07-25
作者简介:张健(1974-),男,山东泰安人,教授,院长,博士生导师,研究方向为信息系统与智能决策;廖梦洁(1989-),女,北京人,博士研究生,研究方向为管理决策建模分析;齐林(1987-),男,河北保定人,讲师,博士,研究方向为循环经济系统工程。
基金资助:
北京市社科基金重点资助项目(16JDGLA030)

Study on the Evolution of the Servicizing Strategy of Bounded Rational ManufacturingCluster under the Condition of Government Various Incentives

ZHANG Jian¹, LIAO Meng-jie², QI Lin¹

1.School of Economic Management, Beijing Information Science and Technology University, Beijing 100192, China;
2.College of Economics and Management, China Agricultural University, Beijing 100083, China

Received:2018-02-12 Online:2019-07-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 服务化转型是传统制造企业实现向价值链两端高收益空间演化的重要驱动,却受到转型成本高、转型难度大等多重阻碍。推动制造业服务化政策设置的合理与否,关乎制造企业产业优化升级的成败。本文以由有限理性的寡头与一般企业组成的传统制造集群为研究对象,依据演化博弈理论建立了政府差异化激励条件下集群服务化转型策略的演化博弈模型,利用可视化系统仿真演释了制造集群寡头企业群体与一般企业群体的服务化策略选择过程。研究表明,政策激励设置的合理性直接影响制造集群服务化转型升级的成败,政策制定者应避免陷入无法使制造企业选择服务化策略的政策困境。本文为制造集群服务化激励水平的设定提供了理论依据和解决思路。

关键词: 制造服务化, 政府差异化激励, 制造集群, 演化博弈, 系统仿真

Abstract: As an important boost for traditional manufacturing enterprises to realize the promotion to both ends of the value chain, manufacturing servitization is hindered by high servicizing costs and great difficulty in transformation. The rationality of servitization transferring policy-making has played an important role in manufacturing industrial upgrading. Focusing on the oligopoly and general enterprise in manufacturing cluster, an evolutionary game model is established based on the evolutionary game theory which explains the servicizing strategy of bounded rational manufacturing cluster under the condition of government various incentives. Besides, visual system simulation is carried on concerning the path of the servicizing strategy of oligopoly and general enterprise in manufacturing cluster. The results show that the rationality of government incentives directly affects the manufacturing cluster servitization transferring. Policy-makers should avoid a policy dilemma: manufacturers are not able to choose a service strategy. This study provides a theoretical foundation and a feasible solution for setting the incentives levels of the manufacturing servitization.

Key words: manufacturing servitization, government various incentives, manufacturing cluster, evolutionary games, system simulation

中图分类号:

F272.3

张健, 廖梦洁, 齐林. 政府差异化激励条件下有限理性制造集群的服务化策略演化研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2019, 28(7): 133-143.

ZHANG Jian, LIAO Meng-jie, QI Lin. Study on the Evolution of the Servicizing Strategy of Bounded Rational ManufacturingCluster under the Condition of Government Various Incentives[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2019, 28(7): 133-143.

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政府差异化激励条件下有限理性制造集群的服务化策略演化研究

Study on the Evolution of the Servicizing Strategy of Bounded Rational ManufacturingCluster under the Condition of Government Various Incentives

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