运筹与管理 ›› 2018, Vol. 27 ›› Issue (12): 193-199.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2018.0296

• 管理科学 • 上一篇    

基于演化博弈的物流企业绿色创新扩散机制研究

于丽静,陈忠全   

  1. 烟台南山学院 商学院,山东 烟台 265700
  • 收稿日期:2017-02-27 出版日期:2018-12-25
  • 作者简介:于丽静(1982-),女,山东烟台人,副教授,硕士,研究方向为物流与供应链管理;陈忠全(1960-),男,河北黄骅人,教授,博士,研究方向为循环经济与数量经济。
  • 基金资助:
    山东省社会科学规划项目(16DGLJ13);山东省高等学校人文社会科学研究项目(J16WF26)

Research on the Green Innovation Diffusion Mechanism of Logistics Enterprises Based on Evolutionary Game

YU Li-jing, CHEN Zhong-quan   

  1. School of Business,Yantai Nanshan University,Yantai 265700, China
  • Received:2017-02-27 Online:2018-12-25

摘要: 绿色创新是物流企业保持竞争优势的有效途径,对降低我国环境污染和应对气候变化具有重要的作用。基于演化博弈的基本理论和方法构建了物流企业群体、政府监管方和消费者群体的三方模型,对其绿色创新扩散的渐进稳定性进行了分析,并运用matlab软件仿真分析了不同参数对绿色创新扩散的影响。研究表明:政府参与监管是物流企业绿色创新扩散的助推器;随着时间的推进,政府最终均会选择退出监管,只是不同监管方式下退出速度不同;政府对物流企业的创新补贴力度应控制一定的范围内。

关键词: 物流企业, 绿色创新扩散, 演化博弈, 仿真, 政府监管

Abstract: Green innovation is an effective way to maintain competitive advantage of logistics enterprises, which plays an important role in reducing environmental pollution and dealing with climate change. The paper builds a tripartite model of logistics enterprise groups, government regulators and consumer groups based on the basic theory and method of evolutionary game, and then analyzes the gradual stability of green innovation diffusion and the influence of different parameters on the diffusion of green innovation by matlab software. The result of the study shows that: the government’s regulation is the booster of the logistics enterprises’ diffusion of green innovation; with time, the government will choose to withdraw from the regulation eventually, but the speed is different under different regulatory ways; the government subsidies of innovation for the logistics enterprises should be controlled within a certain range.

Key words: logistics enterprises, green innovation diffusion, evolutionary game, simulation, government regulation

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