关键词: 救灾体制, 演化博弈, 政府主导, 社会参与, 协同效应

Abstract: China’s disaster relief work should form a model of “Guided by the party committee, led by the government, participated by social forces and market mechanisms extensively”. This paper summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of government-leading and social-leading(“government-social") disaster relief model. On this basis, the evolutionary game model is constructed to analyze the equilibrium conditions and key influencing factors for the formation of the government-social” model. The research shows that the cooperative rescue effect and the sustained stages of disasters relief are the two key factors that determine the evolution of relief model. In the process of institutional evolution from the traditional government-leading model to the ideal “government-social” model, there are several evolutionary paths, such as coordinated game of “double-track system” or periodic solution. Unilaterally relying on the government to promote the reform of the disaster relief system will fall into the long-term coexistence of the old and new systems with the solidified sector interests, thus we need to encourage social forces to participate in the disaster relief to force the reform. With the development from the stage of emergency rescue to transitional resettlement and post-disaster reconstruction, the mode of disaster relief needs to be gradually transformed into that of “government-leading and social-involvement”.

Key words: disaster relief model, evolutionary game, government leading, social involvement, cooperative effect