关键词: 环境保护, 公众参与, 声誉损失, 演化博弈

Abstract: Based on the public’s participation, this paper constructs an environmental protection evolutionary game model of environmental protection between the central government and local governments based on bounded rationality theory, to analyse the strategy choice of local and the central governments about environmental protection. The results show that the central government regulation income, regulatory costs, the negative impact on the reputation of local governments caused by environmental inaction, local environmental protection investment and returns, and the possibility of the environmental inaction found by the public are all important factors affecting the behavior of both sides. Regulatory revenue’s increase and the decrease of cost will help to improve the enthusiasm of the central government. The public’s political evaluation of local environmental inaction is an effective way to improve local government’s efforts. The participation of the public is an important method of cracking information asymmetry and urging the central and local government to take active environmental measures. Finally, combining theoretical analysis and practice, we put forward the incentive measures to protect local government’s efforts to carry out environmental protection work.

Key words: environmental protection, public participation, loss of reputation, evolutionary game