Abstract: In this paper we consider a simple two-echelon supply chain made of one manufacturer and one retailer. The retailer has a preference for distribution fairness except for his share of profit. We study how this additional preference affects the supply chain performance. We model the problem as a manufacturer leading Stackelberg game, while the manufacturer sets the wholesale price and the retailer determines the order quantity. We also work out the optimal equilibrium wholesale price. We show that fairness preference is retailer’s bargain power for supply chain profit with numerical examples.

Key words: supply chain management, stackelberg game, fairness preference, wholesale price contract

摘要： 本论文分析具有公平偏好零售商与制造商组成的供应链,在制造商作为Stackelberg博弈的领导者提供批发价格合同给零售商时,零售商如何确定最优的订货量而制造商如何确定最优的批发价格。当需求满足均匀分布时,研究发现存在均衡的最优订货量以及最优批发价格。本论文也分析了需求分布参数对均衡最优解的影响。最后,通过数值计算对供应链的绩效如何随公平偏好参数变化的问题进行了研究。并且说明公平偏好是零售商获取其对供应链利润分配的一种手段。

关键词: 供应链管理, Stackelberg博弈, 公平偏好, 批发价格合同